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ABSTRACT
Aggregate health expenditures as a share of GDP have risen in the United States from about 5
percent in 1960 to nearly 14 percent in recent years. Why? This paper explores a simple explanation
based on technological progress. Medical advances allow diseases to be cured today, at a cost, that could
not be cured at any price in the past. When this technological progress is combined with a Medicare- like
transfer program to pay the health expenses of the elderly, the model is able to reproduce the basic facts
of recent U.S. experience, including the large increase in the health expenditure share, a rise in life
expectancy, and an increase in the size of health-related transfer payments as a share of GDP.
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FIGURE 1. OECD Health Expenditures as a Share of GDP





























Source: OECD (2000), Table 16.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1960, aggregate health expenditures in the United States were 5.1
percentofGDP;by1997,thehealthexpendituresharestoodat13.6percent.
Why have health expenditures as a share of GDP risen so dramatically?
One conventional explanation holds that U.S. government policy is re-
sponsible. Changes in transfer programs such as Medicare and Medicaid
have possibly led to the increased spending on health. One problem with
this explanation, however, is that similar increases in health expenditures
as a share of GDP have been observed throughout the OECD, as shown in
Figures 1 and 2. It is true, as is often noted, that the United States spends
a larger fraction of its income on health than other countries, but the recent
tendency for this expenditure ratio to increase seems to be a widespreadHEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 3
FIGURE 2. OECD Health Share vs. Life Expectancy, 1960 and 1997
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Notes: Observations for 1960 are plotted by country code with lowercase letters;
uppercase letters correspond to observations for 1997. Data from OECD (2000),
Tables 7 and 16. Life Expectancy is for males only.
phenomenon. The typical change across the OECD is an increase in the
health expenditure share from about 4 percent of GDP to about 8 percent.
Another possible explanation is the cost disease story of Baumol (1967).
According to this explanation, health care, like other services, uses labor
intensively and exhibits relatively low productivity growth. This leads to
a rising relative price of health care and, depending on preferences, to a
risingshareofexpenditures. Supercially,thisargumentappearssomewhat
plausible, as measured labor productivity growth in the health sector was
negative between 1987 and 1997 and the medical care component of the
CPI grew faster than the overall CPI (Triplett and Bosworth (2000)). On4 CHARLES I. JONES
the other hand, the general cost disease explanation for health care rings
hollow in the face of rapid technological advances such as the discovery
of new drugs, diagnostic equipment, and medical procedures that appear
to be occurring throughout the health sector. Moreover, it is clear that
measurement problems in this sector are severe, and attempts to correct
these measurement problems support the casual observation that medical
care is a sector with rapid technological change. As just one example,
Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler (1998) report that between 1983
and 1994, the real quality-adjusted price of heart attack treatments actually
declined at an annual rate of 1.1 percent.1
Newhouse (1992) provides a nice survey of possible explanations for the
riseinhealth expenditures asa shareof GDP. Inaddition tochanges in U.S.
policy and the Baumol cost-disease story, Newhouse considers and rejects
explanations driven by the increase in health insurance, increased income
and health as a luxury good, and supplier-induced demand for medical
care. For example the income effects explanation is problematic in large
part because estimates of the income elasticity of demand for medical care
in the United States, holding insurance constant, are only about 0.2 to 0.4.
After reviewing in detail these possible explanations, Newhouse nds
that he is left with a large residual: these explanations account for only a
minority of the increase in health expenditures, certainly less than half and
perhaps less than a quarter. Instead, Newhouse argues that I believe the
bulkoftheresidualincreaseisattributabletotechnologicalchange, orwhat
might loosely be called the march of science and the increased capabilities
of medicine (p. 11).
1Triplett(forthcoming)showshowsuchcorrectionsofpriceindexescanimpactmeasured
productivity. As an exercise, he applies a price index that shows zero ination in medical
care to the entire health sector. With this change, multifactor productivity in health services
increases at a rate of 5.6 percent per year between 1987 and 1997, rather than declining at
an annual rate of 2.6 percent.HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 5
Thispaperconstructsasimplemodeltoexaminetheeffectsofthemarch
of science on health expenditures. Technological advances allow diseases
and other health problems that could not be cured at any price in the past
to be treated effectively today. Consider the development of MRIs, arthro-
scopic medical procedures, antibiotics, angioplasty, and drugs that treat
depression. Before these and other technologies were discovered, health
expenditure shares were low by default. The gradual discovery of new
treatments over time directly increases the expenditure share by permitting
the desired health expenditures to occur.
Of course, a countervailing force is that technological progress continu-
ally reduces the cost of any given treatment, as in the heart attack example
given above. MRIs and heart attack treatments  once adjusted for quality
 are much cheaper today than a decade ago. How these two forms of
technological progress ultimately inuence aggregate health expenditures
is something this paper will explore.
Another important component of the model is a Medicare-like transfer
program. As modeled, this program features an endogenous tax rate that
adjusts to ensure that the elderly live as long as is technologically feasible.
This transfer system and technological progress turn out to be a powerful
combination. Unchecked, this combination produces a rapidly growing
health share that can eventually consume an arbitrarily large fraction of
GDP. A critical parameter of the model then turns out to be the maximum
transfer rate that society is willing to tolerate.
Thepaperisorganizedinthefollowingway. Section2developsthebasic
model, while Section 3 adds the transfer program. Section 4 shows that
the model, for plausible parameter values, is consistent with the Newhouse
viewthatthemarchofscienceaccountsforthemajorityoftheincreaseinthe
aggregatespendingshare. Section5providesafullyworked-outsimulation
of the model for a particular parameterization. Section 6 presents some6 CHARLES I. JONES
additional evidence on the validity of the model, and Section 7 offers some
concluding remarks.
2. BASIC ACCOUNTING IN A SIMPLE MODEL
Inthissectionwepresentaverystylizedmodelmeanttocapturesomeof
the facts related to health expenditures. The model neglects many aspects
oftherealityofmedicalcareinordertokeepthemodelassimpleaspossible
and to focus on the role of technological progress.
2.1. Microfoundations
Suppose there are a range of health problems that can afict a person.
These problems are indexed by x 2 [0;1) and are ordered so that health
problems with a higher x are scientically more difcult to treat. At any
point in time, successful treatments have been discovered only for health
problems in the range [0;  x(t)].
Let `(x;t) denote life expectancy for someone successfully treated for
condition x at time t. In modern actuarial tables, life expectancy has a
statistical meaning, different from the number of years a typical person
might expect to live, which depends on future technological progress. To
avoid making assumptions about the future, life expectancy is calculated
as the expected length of life for a person born today and forever facing
the mortality rates that prevail in the cross-section of ages today. With one
change, we will give a similar interpretation to `. The change is that `
measuresthe expected lengthoflifeassumingalltechnologically-available
treatments are utilized. In fact, as we will see, some technologies may be
so expensive that they will not be utilized and people will die who, at some
cost, could live longer. We assume that `(x;t) is given by
`(x;t) =  x(t)   x: (1)HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 7
Life expectancy is higher for less severe conditions, but falls to zero for
someone who contracts the most severe health problem that can be treated,
 x(t). In the absence of a treatment for any health problem, a person dies.
Once a treatment is discovered, the cost of treating condition x is
 h(x;t) =  h0ex (t (x)); (2)
where(x)denotesthedateatwhichasuccessfultreatmentforconditionx
is rst discovered. The cost of treating a disease when the treatment is rst
discovered increases at rate  with the severity of the disease. However,
after the initial treatment is discovered, subsequent technological progress
continually reduces the cost of treating the disease at rate . In the model,
then, technological progress affects health expenditures in two different
ways. The march of science leads to the discovery of costly treatments for
health problems that could previously not be cured, but it also reduces the
cost of those treatments over time.
We model both kinds of technological progress as exogenous and as-
sume that the date at which the rst successful treatment for condition x is
discovered is given by
(x) = (x    x0); (3)
where  x0 representsthefrontierofmedicalknowledgeattimet = 0. Every
 years, the march of science shifts this frontier out by one unit.
2.2. Some useful implications
We now derive the distribution of health expenditures across people as a
function of life expectancy, and we then derive the time series process for
economy-wide life expectancy. These derivations are particularly useful
when it comes time to match the model up with data.8 CHARLES I. JONES
Some straightforward algebra shows that2
h(`;t)   h(x(`);t) = h0et `; (4)
where
  = (5)
and
   +  = ( + ): (6)
Healthexpendituresarehighestforpeopleneardeathanddeclineexponen-
tially across people at rate  as life expectancy rises. A person with a lower
life expectancy has higher health expenditures for two reasons, as can be
seen in equation (6). First, the person suffers from more serious medical
problems, which increase the cost of treatment at rate . Second, the initial
treatments for these more serious medical problems have been discovered
more recently, meaning that the cost-reducing technological progress asso-
ciated with  has had less time to reduce the cost of treatment.3
Equation (4) also describes how this distribution of health expenditures
shifts over time. At a given level of life expectancy, health expenditures
rise over time at rate   =. As the presence of the parameter  in
this expression makes clear, this increase reects the fact that people at a
givenleveloflifeexpectancysufferfrommoresevereandthereforemore
costlymedicalproblemsovertime. Thesickestpersonintheeconomyin
2002 is much more costly to treat than the sickest person in 1950 because
technological progress has signicantly shifted out the frontier medical
condition that can be treated.
2First, notice that  x(t) =  x0 +t=, so that x =  x0 +t= `. Substituting this relation
together with the equation describing (x) gives the desired result, where h0   h0e
 x0:
3The parameter  in this equation plays the role of an exchange rate, converting between
parameters describing growth over time ( and ) and a parameter that describes a growth
rate across ages ().HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 9
A more straightforward implication of the model relates to economy-
widelifeexpectancy. Thehighestlifeexpectancyinthepopulationisgiven
by `(0;t) =  x(t) =  x0 + t=, where the last equality comes from setting
t = ( x(t))inequation(3). Thiscorrespondsnicelytowhatdemographers
calculateaslifeexpectancyatbirth,anditwillbeusefultogivethisquantity
its own variable name,  a(t):




Because of technological progress, economy-wide life expectancy rises by
1 year every  years. White (2002) shows that this linear formulation
provides an excellent t of the data in high-income countries in the second
half of the twentieth century with  approximately equal to 5.
2.3. Remaining setup
The remaining setup of the model involves the distribution of the popu-
lation, timing considerations, and a description of income. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that the population is uniformly distributed across
life expectancy at each point in time, with ` 2 [`(t); a(t)].4 The endoge-
nous variable `(t) will be equal to zero if all available technologies are
utilized. It will be greater than zero to the extent that some technologies
are not used. For example, suppose that ` = 2 at some time. In this
case, people die when they, if all treatments were used, could live for two
additional years. This might be an outcome if those additional treatments
are extraordinarily expensive. We will dene
a(t)   a(t)   `(t): (8)
This can be thought of as actual life expectancy at birth in the population at
timet,and,sincethepopulationisuniformlydistributedacross`,itdenotes
4From equation (1), we are essentially assuming a uniform distribution across health
conditions.10 CHARLES I. JONES
thesize(measure)ofthepopulationattimet. Notethattheassumptionthat
thepopulationremainsuniformlydistributedacross`whilelifeexpectancy
is growing means that there is population growth.
The timing of the model works as follows. Time is discrete. At the
beginning of a period, people undertake their health expenditures, and then
live for that period. People whose life expectancies in period t are in the
range [`(t);`(t) + 1) die at the end of that period.
Finally, let Y (t) denote aggregate income at time t so that y(t) 
Y (t)=a(t) is per capita income. We assume y(t) = y0egt so that per
capita income grows exogenously at the constant rate g. At this point, we
do not need to make any assumptions about the distribution of this income
across people.
2.4. Analysis
With this setup, we are ready to solve for aggregate health expenditure

















That is, the aggregate expenditure share is the average of the individual
expenditure shares.5
5Notice that we are abusing the language a bit with this statement. Because we've
made no assumptions about the distribution of income, the correct statement would be
that the aggregate share is a weighted average of the individual expenditure shares, where
the weights correspond to income shares. That is, we could multiply and divide the term
inside the integral by y(`;t). Rather than proceed in this way, it is convenient to leave
the expression as h(`;t)=y(t). We will speak of this as the health expenditure share by
someone with life expectancy `, but the income-weight caveat should be kept in mind.HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 11



















(1   e a(t)): (12)
The rst line of this expression exploits a simple fact that the integral of
an exponential process is proportional to the difference between its value
at the two endpoints.6 The second line takes advantage of the fact that this
difference is proportional to the expenditure share by the person closest to
death.










There are several things to note about this result. First, the aggregate
health expenditure share is proportional to the largest quantity of health
expenditures in the population divided by per capita GDP. Let us call this
term,h(`;t)=y(t),thehealthexpenditureshareattheendoflife,becauseit
reects the health expenditures of individuals with the minimal level of life
expectancy. Itisslightlymisleadingtocallitanexpendituresharebecauseit
ispercapitaincomeinthedenominatorratherthananyindividual'sincome.
Still, it is convenient to have a short phrase to describe this quantity.
Second,thefactorofproportionalitydependsinverselyonlifeexpectancy,
a(t). Holding constant the expenditure share of people near death, an in-
crease in economy-wide life expectancy reduces the aggregate expenditure
6A more intuitive way to view this mathematical fact is to consider the average of an
exponential process rather than the sum. If x(t) = x0e





equal to 1=gT  (x(T)   x(0)). Rearranging, we see that g = 1=T  (x(T)   x(0))= x.
The exponential growth rate is equal to the percentage change in the process, where the
change is taken relative to, not the starting or ending value, but to the exponential average
itself.12 CHARLES I. JONES
share. We will call this the dilution effect. Recall that the aggregate spend-
ing share is the average of the individual spending shares. A higher level
of life expectancy, with the highest expenditure share held constant, essen-
tially means a larger measure of low-cost healthy people over which we are
averaging. Atanypointintime, therearealwaysveyearsworthofpeople
who are ve years away from dying. This is true whether economy-wide
lifeexpectancyis60yearsor80years, butinthelattercase, theseveyears
worth of people constitute a smaller fraction of the population.
Third,becauseofthisdilutioneffect,growthintheaggregateexpenditure
share requires the expenditure share at the end of life to grow faster than
life expectancy. Using equation (4), we can replace this expenditure share










A necessary condition for H=Y to grow is that  > g, i.e. that health
expenditures at a given level of life expectancy grow faster than per capita
GDP.
Finally, we can use the approximation in equation (14) to get a rough
sense of the numbers involved. As discussed in the introduction, between
1960 and 1997, the U.S. health expenditure share rose from 5.1 percent
to 13.6 percent, that is by a factor of 13:6=5:1 = 2:7. Similarly, life
expectancy over this period rose from 66.6 years to 73.9 year, or by a factor
of 73:9=66:6 = 1:11, according to the data in Figure 2. To match these
numbers, the expenditure share at the end of life must rise by a factor of
2:7  1:11 = 3:0. Assuming ` is constant and g = :018, this requires a
value of  = :047. That is, health expenditures by people shortly before
they die must have been rising at a rate of 4.7 percent per year.
Byitself,thisresultisnotsurprisingitissimplyamatterofaccounting.
If H=Y has been rising and if health expenditures are distributed exponen-HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 13
tially across the population, then the health expenditure share at the end of
life must have been rising, and we have simply calculated the rate at which
this rise must occur.
Thecarefulreadermaynowbebotheredbysomething: iftheexpenditure
shareofdecedentsgrowswithoutbound,whatpreventsH=Y fromgrowing
beyond 100 percent? The answer, of course, must be that the expenditure
shareattheendoflifecannotgrowwithoutbound: atsomepoint,individual
health expenditures relative to per capita income must level off. Since we
have not discussed the economic forces governing an individual's choice
of health expenditure, this result has been suppressed; it will be explored
in detail in the next section.
Still, we can pause to see the basic implication of this bound. Sup-
pose that h(`;t)=y(t) reaches an upper bound and stops growing. From
equation (13), the dilution effect will then dominate and H=Y declines,
eventually asymptoting to zero. Recall from equation (10) that the aggre-
gate expenditure share is simply the average of the individual expenditure
shares. With the top expenditure share bounded, this average is continually
diluted by the fact that a rising life expectancy introduces an increasing
number of low-cost healthy individuals.
3. PAY-AS-YOU-GO HEALTH CARE FINANCING
To this point, we have suppressed any budget constraint considerations
in the determination of health expenditures. This neglect is now remedied.
Theindividualexpendituredecisionisimpactedsignicantlybypublicand
private health insurance and by life cycle considerations. Rather than an-
alyze this complicated choice, we make a number of special assumptions
about the economics of individual decision-making. The goal is to build a
model that is simple to analyze yet sophisticated enough to produce inter-
esting results.14 CHARLES I. JONES
At some point, individuals approach the end of life and face large health
expenses. Weassumethattheseexpensesarenancedinthefollowingway.
First, individuals near the end of life have income and wealth that allows
them to spend up to some multiple, , of disposable per capita income on
health care. For simplicity, the level of this resource constraint is assumed
to be the same across people. The parameter  is a reduced-form way to
capture several competing concerns. On the one hand, individuals may
have access to health insurance, discussed below, so that they only need
to pay some fraction of their health expenses, leaving more resources for
consumption and bequests. This suggests that  might be low. On the
other hand, individuals know that they will face large health expenses near
the end of life and may save for this purpose. This would make  high.
Clearly,  couldbegreaterorlessthanone, andinarichermodelwouldnot
be invariant to the policy regime: changes in the health care system would
change. Modelingthesesophisticatedeffectsisimportant. However, itis
also complicated, and the results that one obtains are likely to be sensitive
to the exact nature of private and public health insurance and to behavioral
assumptions. We leave this valuable research to future work and instead
focus on the simpler case where  is a reduced-form parameter, with these
caveats kept in mind.
In addition to their own resources, individuals in this model have access
to a basic health insurance system. We will think of this as public health
insurance, but there is no reason in the model why it could not be run
privately. Theinsuranceschemeisnancedbyaatincometax(premium)
at rate (t). It pays out benets, v(`;t), that depend on health status.
Because of rapid technological progress, the cost of keeping people alive
inthelastyearofliferisesmorerapidlythanpercapitaincome( > g). At
somepoint,thesecostsoutstripanindividual'sabilitytopayfortreatments,
so that even though the technology exists to prolong life, the cost is greaterHEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 15
than the individual can afford. Call the date at which this occurs t, and
notice that this date solves the following equation
h(0;t) = y(t): (15)
Prior to date t, individuals can pay their own health expenses, and we
will assume the insurance scheme does not operate, so that (t) = 0 for
t < t. Up until this date, aggregate health expenses are determined by
equation (13) with `(t) = 0. That is, people live as long as is technologi-
cally possible.
After date t, this changes. The technological costs of keeping individu-
als alive as long as possible may exceed their resources. In the absence of
a transfer scheme, such people would die immediately.
Transfers v(`;t) are paid to these people in exactly the quantity needed
to keep them alive until the budget is exhausted. That is
v(`;t) = h(`;t)   (1   (t))y(t); ` 2 [`(t);  `(t)]; (16)
where  `(t) denotes the life expectancy of the marginal person requiring a
transfer, given implicitly by
h( `(t);t) = (1   (t))y(t): (17)





h(`;t)   h( `(t);t)d`: (18)
We make the following additional assumptions about the insurance in-
stitution. After date t, transfer payments are used to keep people alive as
long as is technologically feasible. That is, equation (18) can be thought
of as determining the insurance premium (t) so that `(t) = 0. We also16 CHARLES I. JONES
assume that this premium/tax rate is capped at   < 1. In general, there will
be a third date t at which time this bound on the tax rate is binding. In
this regime, equation (18) can be thought of as determining `(t) so that
the budget constraint is satised with (t) =  . That is, life expectancy is
rationed by the willingness of society to pay the large health expenses of
those near death.
We pause at this point to highlight the key endogenous variables and the
key equations that determine them. These variables are h(`;t); a(t);a(t),
`(t);  `(t);H(t)=Y (t), and (t). The equations that determine these en-
dogenous values are (4), (7), (8), (17), (18), (13), and the conditions de-
scribed above that set (t) = 0 when t  t, `(t) = 0 for t  t, and
(t) =   when t > t. Notice that t is determined by equation (15)
and t is determined as the date at which (t) =   and `(t) = 0 in
equation (18).
4. SIMULATING THE MODEL, PART I
The survey by Newhouse (1992) suggested that the march of science
was responsible for at least 50 to 75 percent of the rise in U.S. health
expenditures. Now that we have a model in which technological progress
canleadtoarisinghealthshare,thequestioniswhetherornotthemagnitude
of the increase is quantitatively signicant for plausible parameterizations.
Values for some parameters are relatively easy to infer from various
stylized facts. For the underlying growth rate of per capita income, g, we
take a value of 1.8 percent, corresponding roughly to the growth rate of
GDP per capita in the United States in the postwar period. The parameter
 measures the number of years it takes technological progress to raise life
expectancy by a year. In the United States, male life expectancy increased
from 66.6 years in 1960 to 73.9 years in 1997, suggesting a value of  ofHEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 17
(1997   1960)=(73:9   66:6) = 5:07, consistent with the estimates for
advanced countries since 1955 in White (2002).
Picking a value for  gives us the opportunity to examine two differ-
ent pieces of data. Recall that  captures the rate at which health expen-
ditures decline with life expectancy in a cross-section of the population.
Miller (2001) reports average annual Medicare expenditures per enrollee
for 129,166 randomly-chosen people who died in 1989 or 1990, using data
fromLubitz, BeebeandBaker(1995). DatafromtheContinuousMedicare
History Sample tracks their Medicare expenditures back to 1974, allowing
Miller to look at Medicare expenditures versus years before death.7 These
numbers are plotted in Figure 3. While the model assumes this relation
to be log-linear, the data suggest that it is not. Rather, a log-linear spline
seems to t the data better. Medicare expenditures rise at a rate of 9.4
percent per year for people 3 to 10 years away from death. This rate then
acceleratessharplyto45percentperyearinthelasttwoyearsbeforedeath.
This suggests a value of  in the model that is some average of 0.094 and
0.45.8
Fortunately,  can also be calculated using a second piece of data. It is
straightforward to show (see the Appendix) that the fraction of total health
expendituresaccountedforbypeopleinthelastyearoflifeisapproximately
equal to 1   e   . Intuitively, this occurs because the distribution of
7Since the data correspond to Medicare expenditures over time for people who died in a
single year, one might worry that Figure 3 reveals  +  rather than just . Footnote 3 in
Miller (2001) documents that the expenditures are placed in 1990 dollars by multiplying by
afactorcorrespondingtopercapitaMedicareexpendituresinthetwoyears. Thisessentially
undoes the  effect. In terms of the model, it introduces an extra term corresponding to
the proportion by which life expectancy changed between the two years, but this factor is
extremely small relative to the  effects, so I have chosen to report the original Miller data
rather than making the correction.
8The model could be augmented to capture this non-exponential pattern by adding a
term y(t) to the basic spending relation in equation (4). This term incorporates health
expenditures that are largely independent of life expectancy, such as healthy pregnancy and
childbirth expenses, vaccinations, athletic injuries, etc.18 CHARLES I. JONES
FIGURE 3. Average Annual Medicare Expenditures per Enrollee



















Circles represent average expenditures for all enrollees over age 65, taken from
Miller (2001), Table 1.
health expenditures across people is exponential with parameter , and
this entire distribution shifts in the same way over time. Lubitz and Riley
(1993) document that the share of Medicare payments on behalf of people
in the last year of life is relatively stable, uctuating between 27.2 and
30.6 percent over the period 1976 to 1988. This is useful in two ways.
First, Lubitz and Riley emphasize that their result is somewhat surprising:
many people had suspected that the large rise in Medicare expenditures
was disproportionately associated with people in the last year of life. They
show that this is not the case, and the model also predicts that this fraction
should be stable. Second, we can use these numbers to help calibrate .
PresumablythefractionoftotalhealthexpendituresoccuringinthelastyearHEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 19
of life is smaller than the fraction for Medicare.9 Based on this fraction
and on the Miller evidence discussed above, we choose  = 0:2877 so
that 1   e  = 0:25 as a benchmark value, i.e. one quarter of total health
expenditures are assumed to go for people in the last year of life.
The nal parameter  and in fact really the crucial parameter of the




would ideally like to obtain the value of the parameter  without reference
to the magnitude of the increase in the aggregate health expenditure share.
This is what we do now.
For this purpose, the key insight comes from equation (6), which we
reproduce here:
 = ( + ): (19)
Recall that  measures the rate at which health expenditures change in the
cross section with a change in life expectancy. Health expenditures are
higher for a person with lower life expectancy for two reasons. First, the
health problems possessed by this person are more severe, raising costs at
rate . Second, basic treatments for these more severe problems have been
discovered more recently, meaning that the cost-reducing technological
progress occuring at rate  has had less time to operate.
If we knew the value of , equation (19) could be used to back out an
impliedvalueof. Fortunately,estimatesofarenowavailablefromrecent
work in health economics. This parameter corresponds empirically to the
annual rate at which the quality-adjusted cost of treating a specic medical
9This is not entirely clear, however, since many nursing home expenses are not covered
by Medicare.20 CHARLES I. JONES
condition declines over time. As discussed in the introduction, Cutler et
al. (1998) nd that the real quality-adjusted price for treating heart attacks
declines at a rate of 1.1 percent per year between 1983 and 1994. Other
authors report similar ndings. For example, Shapiro, Shapiro and Wilcox
(1999) examine the treatment price for cataracts between 1969 and 1994.
While a CPI-like price index increased at an annual rate of 9.2 percent over
thisperiod,theiralternativepriceindex,onlypartiallyincorporatingquality
improvements, grew only 4.1 percent per year, falling relative to the total
CPI at a rate of about 1.5 percent per year. Berndt, Bir, Busch, Frank and
Normand (2000) estimate that the price of treating incidents of acute phase
major depression declined in nominal terms by between 1.7 percent and
2.1percentperyearbetween1991and1996, correspondingtoarealrateof
decline of more than 3 percent (though over a relatively short time period).
Table 1 solves the model for key results using this evidence and a range
of values for  to pin down . More specically, we consider values of
 of 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, and 0.35, and treatment price declines of 1 percent,
1.5 percent, and 2 percent.10 Table 1 then reports three statistics for each
pair of parameter values. The rst is simply the implied value for . The
second, H=Y Factor, is the factor by which H=Y increases in the model
between 1960 and 1997 given this value for . Using equation (14), H=Y







Finally, Frac. Expl. reports that fraction of the actual increase in H=Y
explained by the model, equal to (\H=Y Factor 1)=(2:67   1), where
10An important consideration in picking the range for the treatment price declines is that
there is also a bias in the total CPI index. The papers considered above attempt to measure
the bias in the treatment price index, but to the extent that the total CPI ination rate is
biased upwards, the real price declines implied by those studies may be overstated. This is
why we limit the upper end of the range to two percent.
11We assume that the (t)    constraint is not binding so that `
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TABLE 1.
Explaining the Rise in H=Y
 Values of  
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35
1. Treatment price decline:    = =  0:01
 0.0295 0.0393 0.0492 0.0591
H=Y Factor 1.38 1.98 2.86 4.12
Frac. Expl. 0.23 0.59 1.11 1.87
2. Treatment price decline:    = =  0:015
 0.0245 0.0343 0.0442 0.0541
H=Y Factor 1.14 1.65 2.37 3.42
Frac. Expl. 0.09 0.39 0.82 1.45
3. Treatment price decline:    = =  0:02
 0.0195 0.0293 0.0392 0.0491
H=Y Factor 0.95 1.37 1.97 2.84
Frac. Expl. -0.03 0.22 0.58 1.11
Note: H=Y Factor is the factor by which H=Y increases, calculated directly from
equation(20). Frac. Expl. denotesthefractionoftheactualincreaseinH=Y explained
by the model and is equal to (\H=Y Factor 1)=(2:67   1), where 2:67 is the actual
factor increase in the U.S. data between 1960 and 1997.22 CHARLES I. JONES
13:6=5:1 = 2:67 is the actual factor increase in the U.S. data between 1960
and 1997.
The results in Table 1 suggest that it is quite plausible that the march
of science accounts for a substantial amount of the increase in health
expenditures as a share of GDP. Without more accurate estimates of  and
the rate at which treatment prices decline, it is difcult to be precise about
the exact explanatory power of the model. Nevertheless, across a wide
range of parameter values the fraction is substantial. The main exception
seems to be if, simultaneously,  is small and treatment prices decline very
rapidly.
5. SIMULATING THE MODEL, PART II
The results from the previous section suggest that advances in medical
technologies can account for a substantial fraction of the increase in the
aggregate health expenditure share. In this section, we pick specic pa-
rameter values for  and  and simulate the model over time to examine its
predictions along other dimensions. In particular, we choose  = 0:0473
and  = 0:2877. The choice of  means that the model will match exactly
the increase in the U.S. health expenditure share. The choice of  means
that one quarter of health expenditures go for people in the last year of life.
For completeness, the implied value of  given these choices is  0:0094,
so that quality-adjusted treatment prices decline at a rate of about 1 percent
peryear. Asshouldbeclearfromthepreviousdiscussion,thereisnoreason
to think these parameter values are exactly correct, and one should not read
too much into the exact quantitative predictions they imply.
A couple of other parameters need to be calibrated in order to simulate
the full model. The parameter  captures in a reduced-form fashion the
individual's budget constraint limit on health expenditures. We assume,
arbitrarily, that  = 1=2 so that individuals can spend no more than oneHEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 23
FIGURE 4. Simulation Results for   = :10



































Note: The two circles in the gure indicate data points for the United States:
an expenditure share of 5.1 percent in 1960 and 13.6 percent in 1997, when life
expectancy was 66.6 and 73.9 years, respectively. See notes to Table 2.
half of per capita income on health. Many of the results below do not
involve this parameter at all. The exception is in determining the level of
transferpayments,wherethesensitivityisdirectandobvious: foranygiven
aggregate level of spending, a higher value of  will reduce the amount of
transfers required to support that level of spending.
Finally, the parameter value for h0=y0 has been chosen so that the sim-
ulation results match exactly U.S. aggregate health expenditures as a share
of GDP in 1960. This leads to a value of h0=y0 = :9771.
Figure 4 shows the aggregate health expenditure share and the transfer
rate  over time for a simulated economy. Statistics on H=Y , life ex-








  = :10
1900 0.011 0.000 54.8 54.8 0.000 0.000 0.168
1920 0.018 0.000 58.7 58.7 0.000 0.000 0.302
1940 0.030 0.000 62.7 62.7 0.000 0.005 0.544
1960 0.051 0.008 66.6 66.6 0.000 0.035 0.977
1970 0.066 0.017 68.6 68.6 0.000 0.050 1.310
1980 0.087 0.032 70.5 70.5 0.000 0.064 1.756
1990 0.113 0.054 72.5 72.5 0.000 0.077 2.355
1997 0.136 0.074 73.9 73.9 0.000 0.086 2.891
2000 0.147 0.085 74.5 74.5 0.000 0.090 3.157
2010 0.163 0.100 76.5 75.9 0.598 0.094 3.564
2050 0.161 0.100 84.4 79.8 4.551 0.087 3.693
2100 0.158 0.100 94.2 84.7 9.499 0.079 3.854
  = :05
1900 0.011 0.000 54.8 54.8 0.000 0.000 0.168
1920 0.018 0.000 58.7 58.7 0.000 0.000 0.302
1940 0.030 0.000 62.7 62.7 0.000 0.005 0.544
1960 0.051 0.008 66.6 66.6 0.000 0.035 0.977
1970 0.066 0.017 68.6 68.6 0.000 0.050 1.310
1980 0.087 0.032 70.5 70.5 0.000 0.064 1.756
1990 0.108 0.050 72.5 72.4 0.149 0.075 2.256
1997 0.108 0.050 73.9 73.1 0.843 0.074 2.269
2000 0.108 0.050 74.5 73.4 1.141 0.073 2.274
2010 0.107 0.050 76.5 74.3 2.133 0.072 2.292
2050 0.105 0.050 84.4 78.3 6.104 0.066 2.363
2100 0.102 0.050 94.2 83.1 11.073 0.061 2.450
Note: Simulationresultswiththefollowingparameters:  = 5:0685, = :0473, = 1=2,
g = :018, y0 = 1, h0=y0 = :9771. Fraction Subsidized denotes the fraction of the
population receiving a health expenditure subsidy, ( `   `
)=a
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Several results from the simulation deserve mention. First, the aggregate
health expenditure share grows rapidly until (t) =  , here set (arbitrarily)
to 10 percent. As long as ` = 0, that is as long as all technologies are
utilized, the exponentially rising cost of the frontier technology causes the
aggregate health share to increase. Mathematically, this result is already
familiar from equation (14): the health expenditure share of decedents
grows at rate    g while life expectancy grows only linearly. Second,
there exist parameter values such that the simulation matches exactly the
level of H=Y in 1960 and 1997, and the rate of increase in between.
Third,   reects the maximum level of resources that this economy is
willing to transfer from healthy people to sick people. In practice,   is the
outcome of a very complicated political economy problem, and it could
changeovertimeasthepoliticalcalculuschanges. However, followingour
basicapproachinthismodel,wetreatthispoliticaloutcomeparametrically.
What one sees from the simulation is that once this political constraint is
binding, the dynamics of H=Y change drastically. Before the constraint
binds,theaggregatehealthexpendituresharegrowsrapidlyassocietytrans-
fers an increasing fraction of resources from the healthy to the sick. Once
this source of additional funding is exhausted  which in this simulation
happens in the year 2004  the rise in H=Y comes to a halt and in fact
the aggregate health share begins a slow, steady decline. The source of this
decline was apparent back in equation (14): if growth in the expenditure
share at the end of life is halted (or at least slowed considerably), the di-
lution effect takes over. Because of technological progress, the rise in life
expectancy means that the population consists of an increasing fraction of
healthy people. In the simulation in Figure 4, this dilution effect dominates
after the   constraint is hit. H=Y declines, asymptoting to the value given
by   itself, since by construction society is always spending at least this
much of its income on health.26 CHARLES I. JONES
But if the individuals near death are always spending (1   )y of their
own resources on health, why does the aggregate share asymptote to  ?
The answer is suggested by the Fraction Subsidized column in Table 2.
In particular, notice that the fraction of the population benetting from
the subsidy rst rises and then declines after the   constraint becomes
binding. That is, the full amount of the subsidy becomes increasingly
concentratedwithinthepopulationaftertheconstraintismet, sothathealth
expenditures nanced by the resources of these people shrinks to zero. A
political economy implication of this result is that it may be difcult to
sustain a positive value of   in the long run.
The policy parameter   obviously plays a key role in the simulation
results. If it were set higher, the rapid growth of H=Y would continue
longer. And if it were set lower, H=Y would peak sooner.
Thereisasenseinwhichthemultiplierassociatedwithachangein   is
large. Figure 5 examines the consequences of cutting   in half, from .10 to
.05,startingfromthebeginningofthesimulation. Inthiscase,theconstraint
that (t) <   starts to bind in 1989 rather than in 2004, and the aggregate
health expenditure share peaks in that year at 10.8 percent, or 5.8 percent
above  . Notice that this is less than the gap when   = :10, which equals
16.3-10=6.3 percent: the transfer rate is associated with a multiplier that
is greater than one. The intuition for this result is that transfer payments
increase the number of people near death, and these people themselves
spend some of their own resources on health. As one would expect, a
higher value of  will increase this multiplier.
The substantial reduction in health expenditures as a share of GDP asso-
ciated with the lower transfer rate of   = :05 has a relatively small effect
on life expectancy, as can be seen in the lower panel of Table 2. In the
year 1997, for example, life expectancy in the original simulation matched
U.S. life expectancy at 73.9 years. In the simulation with   = :05, life ex-HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 27
FIGURE 5. Simulation Results for   = :05






























Note: See notes to Figure 4.
pectancyin1997isjustunderoneyearlessat73.1years. About2.8percent
of GDP goes to pay the health expenses of people living the additional 0.8
years, suggesting a ratio of 2.8/0.8=3.5 percent of GDP for each additional











H=Y (e  1). With  = :2877 and H=Y = 10:8, we get 3.6 percent of
GDP.28 CHARLES I. JONES
Alternatively, if we start with the observed H=Y = :136 in 1997, this
suggests a cost of :136  e:2877 1 = :045, or 4.5 percent of GDP for
each additional year of life expectancy at the margin in 1997. Is this a
lot or a little? Obviously the answer depends on preferences and other
complicatedconsiderations. However,wecanshedlightonthisquestionin
twoways. In1997, percapitaGDPwasabout$28,000, andlifeexpectancy
was a(1997) = 73:9 years. Multiplying these two numbers together
yields Y (t) = a(t)y(t) of about 2 million dollars, and 4.5 percent of this
is $93,000. This number is right in the middle of economists' estimates
of the value of one year of life, which range from about $50,000 to about
$150,000 according to Cutler and McClellan (2001).
The range of uncertainty surrounding such a calculation is large. Still
the calculation is useful in that it suggests that spending 13.6 percent of
GDP on health care is not obviously crazy. This result is consistent with
related ndings in the literature. Cutler and McClellan (2001) estimate
that between 1950 and 1990, the present discounted value of the amount
an individual could expect to spend on medical care over her entire life
rose by $35,000. During the same period, life expectancy increased by
about seven years, which Cutler and McClellan claim is worth a present
value of $130,000. They conclude that if health expenditures explain more
than about a quarter of the rise in life expectancy, then these benets from
increased health spending exceeded the costs.12
A recent report by a panel of experts on the technical merits of the Medi-
careTrustees'nancialprojectionsprovidessomestartlingforecastsrelated
to health expenditures as a share of GDP.13 For example, the middle-range
estimate  which assumes health expenditures grow at a rate 1 percent
12Other related calculations on the gains from the increase in life expectancy can be
found in Murphy and Topel (2002) and Nordhaus (2002).
13See Technical Review Panel on the Medicare Trustees Reports (2000).HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 29
faster than GDP  forecasts an aggregate expenditure share of 25% in
2050 and 38% in 2075, and the report states that The Panel does not view
this [latter] gure as implausible (p. 39).
The model sheds light on this forecast in two ways. First, the model
is potentially consistent with this forecast as long as society is willing to
continually transfer more and more resources to people near the end of life,
i.e. as long as   is sufciently large. On the other hand, the model suggests
areasontobecautiousaboutthesekindofforecasts: thedynamicsofH=Y
look very different before and after the   constraint becomes binding. If
society decides to cap the transfer rate, these forecasts could be far from
the mark.
Second, the calculations on the value of a year of life implicitly provide
an upper bound on the fraction of GDP that might optimally be spent on
medical care. For example, in the rst calculation the value of $93,000 was
right in the middle of the typical estimates of the value of a year of life,
perhaps indicating that the upper bound on H=Y is not too far away.
6. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
We now turn to other pieces of evidence that can be used to assess the
success of the model, the rst of which involves health-related transfer
payments. The aggregate health expenditure share starts to decline when
the economy hits the constraint on transfers,  . Interestingly, U.S. federal
and state health expenditures as a share of GDP show a pattern not unlike
that of (t) in the simulation. In 1960, this share was 1.3 percent. It
rose steadily over time before peaking in 1995 at 6.3 percent and declining
slightly to 6.1 percent in 1998.14 As shown in Figure 1, this peak in the
publichealthsharecorrespondscloselytothepeakinH=Y ,aspredictedby
14These numbers are computed from National Center for Health Statistics (2000), Table
115, page 322.30 CHARLES I. JONES
FIGURE 6. Changes in Health Share vs. Changes in Life Expectancy
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Notes: Data from OECD (2000), Tables 7 and 16. Life Expectancy is for males
only.
themodel. ChangesinU.S.Medicarepolicyandtheincreasedemphasison
managed care during the 1990s might be thought of as factors that affected
 .
One piece of evidence that is commonly thought to be a problem for
a model like this is that there is essentially no correlation between the
changes in life expectancy and the changes in the health expenditure share
throughout the OECD. The levels are strongly correlated, as shown earlier
in Figure 2, but the changes are not, as documented in Figure 6. Countries
in which life expectancy increased by a large amount did not on average
experience large increases in health expenditures as a share of GDP.HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 31
In fact, careful reection suggests that the model may be consistent with
this evidence. It is important to appreciate that the model does not predict
a monotonic relationship between changes in life expectancy and changes
in H=Y . Recall from Figure 4 that H=Y can either rise or fall as life ex-
pectancy increases, depending on whether or not the (t)    constraint is
binding. An economy that is unconstrained by   will see increases in the
healthshareassociatedwithtechnologically-drivengainsinlifeexpectancy
but an economy that has reached its   would experience decreases in the
health share associated with such gains. Consider the following compari-
son. The United States and the United Kingdom had similar changes in life
expectancy between 1960 and 1997, which rose by about 7 years in both
countries. In contrast, the increases in H=Y were vastly different: H=Y
rose by more 8 percentage points in the United States but only by about 3
percentage points in the U.K. A possible explanation of this marked differ-
ence is that the U.S. let technological considerations determine its transfer
payments while the U.K. limited increases in (t). As discussed earlier,
large differences in aggregate health expenditures are typically associated
with small differences in life expectancy in the model. These differences
aresmallenoughthattheycouldeasilybeswampedbyotherconsiderations
such as demography and income distribution.15
7. CONCLUSION
WhyhavehealthexpendituresasashareofGDPbeenrisingintheUnited
States and throughout the OECD? This paper considers an explanation in
15More generally, differences in public health, nutrition, diet, and economic growth may
help to explain some of the differences in life expectancy gains across countries. For
example, both Japan and Norway had similar changes in health expenditure shares, but
remarkably different changes in life expectancy. This could be related to the fact that over
the period 1960 to 1992, Japan was one of the world's fastest growing countries, and to the
nutritional gains that were associated with this growth.32 CHARLES I. JONES
which health expenditures and life expectancy are endogenous variables
driven by technological progress. Advances in medicine permit people
to spend resources on health care in order to extend life. Starting from
initial conditions in which very little is spent on health care because of
the absence of such opportunities, this naturally leads to an increase in the
health expenditure share. Moreover, advances in life expectancy permit
people to live to face more serious medical problems, such as heart attacks
and hip replacements, that in turn are eventually cured, but only at a price.
Combiningthistheoryoftheeffectsoftechnologicalchangewithatrans-
fer program that allows health expenditures at the end of life to rise to four
times per capita income produces a framework that is broadly consistent
with the following stylized facts:
1. Medicare expenditures rise sharply as life expectancy declines in a
cross section, at a rate of about 10 percent until life expectancy falls to 3
years and then at a rate of nearly 45 percent in the last couple of years of
life.
2. The fraction of Medicare expenditures accounted for by people in the
last year of life is about 30 percent, and this number is surprisingly stable
over time.
3. While as much as 4 percent of U.S. GDP may go to pay the health
expensesofpeopleinthelastyearoflife,itisnotatallclearthatthisreects
an inefciency in the health care system.
4. Technological progress reduces the quality-adjusted cost of treating
specic medical conditions, at a rate that seems to be about one or two
percent per year.
5. Life expectancy in the United States since 1960 has risen at a rate of
about 2 years every decade.HEALTH EXPENDITURES AS A SHARE OF GDP 33
6. Health expenditures as a share of GDP have risen from 5.1 percent in
1960 to 13.6 percent in 1997. At least half, and most likely three-quarters




8. Health-related transfer payments as a share of GDP have increased
substantially.
9. Across countries, there is very little correlation between changes in
life expectancy and changes in health expenditures as a share of GDP.
Simulations of the model suggest that a critical determinant of health
expenditures as a share of GDP is the willingness of society to transfer
resources to people near the end of life. As long as this willingness is
unconstrained, the health share in the model rises rapidly. On the other
hand, once a cap on these transfers is reached, the model predicts a halt
to the rising health share and even a slow, gradual decline to a long-run
level corresponding to the transfer rate. The source of this decline is a
dilution effect associated with rising life expectancy. There are always
ve years worth of people with life expectancies of ve years or less. As
life expectancy rises, the fraction of the population accounted for by these
people declines. If the expenditure share of these high-cost people is kept
fromgrowingtoorapidly,theincreasingfractionoflow-costhealthypeople
reduces the aggregate expenditure share.
The model clearly has a number of serious limitations. Most obviously,
it treats in a reduced-form fashion a number of key parameters, including
, , , , and  . A productive avenue for future research is to exam-
ine the microfoundations that determine these parameter values. Such a
study would be forced to confront the important but complicated effects34 CHARLES I. JONES
of health insurance, the relation between life expectancy and technological
progress,andthepoliticaleconomyofhealth-relatedtransferpayments,not
to mention the interactions between these phenomena. As just one inter-
esting example, Weisbrod (1991) emphasizes the role played by the nature
of health insurance in determining the rate and direction of technological
progress.
APPENDIX
Health expenditures in the last year of life
This appendix calculates the fraction of total health expenditures that are
associated with people in the last year of life. Let H(a;b;t) denote health
expenditures by people with life expectancies in the range [a;b]. Then,











h(`;t)(1   e ): (A.1)






 (1   e ): (A.2)
HealthexpendituresinthelastyearoflifeasashareofGDPareproportional
to H=Y at rate 1   e   . This factor, in turn, is then the fraction of
total health expenditures associated with people in the last year of life.
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